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The Introduction of the CAC40 Master Unit and the CAC40 Index 
Spot-Futures Pricing Relationship 
Abstract 
Our article investigates the impact of the introduction of the CAC40 Master Unit ETF on 
the cash-futures pricing relationship between the CAC40 futures contract and its underlying 
index. Using tick-by-tick CAC40 futures data and 30-s interval data for the CAC40 index, we 
not only analyse deviations from no-arbitrage prices but also time to efficiency. We find 
evidence of a significant reduction in the frequency of ex post deviations as well as in their 
size when controlling for volatility, liquidity and dividend delivery. Concerning the speed of 
price reversion in response to arbitrage opportunities, tests upon ex ante arbitrage profits and 
time to efficiency show an efficiency improvement for sell arbitrages only.   2
1. Introduction 
The number of index-based securities, known as Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) or 
trackers, have exploded since their first introduction in the 90s on the Canadian and US equity 
markets. They emerged in Europe in 2000 when the Frankfort and the London stock 
exchanges opened their tracker markets, and their number has increased tremendously ever 
since. ETFs are investment funds designed to replicate an index. These funds are open ended 
in the sense that their shares may be created and redeemed in very large blocks. Their 
popularity is assignable to the ease with which they allow any category of investors to obtain 
portfolio diversification benefits at low trading costs. Their relatively low price per share 
gives the opportunity to small investors to take positions in an entire index. In such, market 
efficiency improvements may be expected from their introduction. In particular, given that 
they replicate baskets of existing securities and that some of these baskets serve as an 
underlying asset for derivatives, the inception of trackers may have an impact on the joint 
efficiency of those related markets. Cherry (2004) addresses the issue of the efficiency 
relationship between ETFs and their underlying indices and finds that ETFs are priced more 
efficiently priced than close-end funds but still trade away from their net asset value with 
abnormal discounts considering their transparency
3 and liquidity. Other authors have studied 
the impact of ETF inception on various no-arbitrage relationships between stock and 
derivative prices (Ackert and Tian (1998), Deville (2002), Deville and Riva (2005), Kurov 
and Lasser (2002), Park and Switzer (1995), Switzer et al. (2000)). The present paper tests 
whether the creation of stocks tracking the CAC40 index improved the well-known no cash-
and-carry (or no reverse cash-and-carry) arbitrage relationship between the spot prices of 
CAC40 components and the CAC40 futures contract prices. To this aim, we exploit tick-by-
tick futures data and intra-day index values, and we compare the frequency, the magnitude 
and the speed of reversion of efficiency violations six months before and six months after 
January 22
nd, 2001, date of the CAC40 Master Unit inception. 
An extensive literature (e.g. Modest and Sundaresan (1983), Figlewski (1984), 
MacKinlay and Ramaswamy (1988), Yadav and Pope (1994)) suggest that significant 
deviations from the cash-futures no arbitrage relationship with potential profits for 
arbitrageurs exist in index futures markets. Chung (1991), Klemkosky and Lee (1991) and 
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Miller  et al. (1994) argue that these deviations are more probably the reflection of 
transactions costs, market non-synchronicity or market illiquidity, than exploitable profits. 
However, recent research by Garrett and Taylor (2000), Tse (2000) and Alphonse (2003) 
shows that arbitrage activity drives, at least partially, mean reversion in futures mispricing. 
The main difficulty that arbitrageurs face in index cash-futures arbitrages is to establish the 
cash leg. Implicit transaction costs, non-synchronicity, price risk due to intra-day volatility 
when trading the stock basket, are as many factors that reduce considerably arbitrage profits. 
Because basket securities lower these frictions as shown by Hegde and McDermott (2004), 
they have been proved to tighten the cash-futures relationship in the case of the Toronto 35 
index (Park and Switzer (1995)), the Standard&Poor’s 500 Composite index (Switzer et al. 
(2000)) and the NASDAQ-100 (Kurov and Lasser (2002)). We check whether the 
introduction of the CAC40 Master Unit had the same impact on the French market, which has 
not been done at the current date. Like Kurov and Lasser (2002), we use the most accurate 
high frequency data that are available for the futures contract and the index. Further, we 
improve the analysis in several respects. First, in our comparison of ex post and ex ante 
deviations, we control not only for intraday index volatility but also for actual implicit costs in 
the CAC40 stocks and CAC40 trading volumes. Second, and more importantly, we measure 
and analyse the durations of deviation reversions. Classical tests of futures market pricing 
efficiency essentially focus on the deviations’ values rather than on their persistence in time. 
Nevertheless, it is argued that ETF trading should induce a quicker reversion of futures prices 
towards no-arbitrage values because arbitrageurs are able to establish their portfolios more 
rapidly. Tests on ex ante arbitrage profits are a means to explore this hypothesis but we 
consider they are insufficient in that they are based on arbitrary lags of arbitrage execution. 
Therefore, we realise tests on the time to efficiency, that is the actual duration of a deviation 
before reversion. 
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
hypotheses tested in the paper. Section 3 describes the data and the calculation of ex post and 
ex ante deviations from no-arbitrage prices. Section 4 reports our findings on the pre-/post-
ETF comparison of mispricing and arbitrage profits, and provides a time-series analysis of 
mispricing levels. Section 5 examines the impact of the ETF introduction on time to 
efficiency. Section 6 concludes.   4
2. Testable hypotheses on the spot-futures pricing relationship and the introduction of 
ETFs 
In the absence of arbitrage opportunities, the cost-of-carry model holds and the 
theoretical price of a index futures contract is given by: 
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where It is the value of the index at time t; r the risk-free interest rate; Dt,T the present value, 
expressed in index points, of the dividends delivered by the index stocks in the period t-T; and 
T the futures maturity. Any deviation of market futures prices from this theoretical value is 
considered as mispricing. Following most studies on futures market efficiency, we define the 
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where Ft is the actual futures price at time t for maturity T. 
The rationale for this formula is the possibility to replicate the futures cash-flows by taking 
adequate positions in the stock basket constituting the index and the interest rate. For futures 
price inferior to the theoretical value, a rational arbitrageur makes a risk-free profit by 
implementing a short or sell arbitrage, that is taking a short position in the index portfolio and 
buying the futures contract. Conversely, when the market futures price is superior to the fair 
value, arbitrages that consist in buying the index portfolio and selling the futures contract, 
usually designated as long or buy arbitrages, are profitable strategies. In each case, arbitrage 
trades will continue until the pressure onto prices is such that they revert to values compatible 
with the no-arbitrage theory. 
However, arbitrage execution is costly. Under the assumption that there exists no restriction 
on trading, arbitrage models predict that arbitrage portfolios will be established as soon as the 
difference between the theoretical futures price and the market futures price is larger than the 
transaction costs incurred for the establishment of the arbitrage portfolio. Hence, costs form 
bounds inside which futures prices can fluctuate without triggering arbitrage-oriented trades. 
An arbitrage profit  T , t π  is then equal to the mispricing value net of the transaction costs c 
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A deviation from efficient prices will trigger arbitrage execution only if its value  T , t x  
exceeds c. 
Empirical tests on the index spot-futures relationship
4 commonly agree that arbitrage 
opportunities exist on all markets, even once transaction costs are accounted for but remain 
small in value. Several explanations for the existence and the persistence of arbitrage 
opportunities have been proposed: delayed incorporation of new information into prices, noise 
trading, liquidity risk
5, institutional constraints etc. Among these market frictions, index-
tracking risk remains the major obstacle to arbitrage execution. ETFs, which replicate indices 
accurately, should thus ease the establishment of arbitrage positions at lower costs and risk. 
The CAC40 Master Unit was introduced on January 22
nd, 2001 on Euronext Nextrack, a 
market segment specifically dedicated to the negotiation of ETFs on Euronext. Table 1 reports 
its trading volume for the first six months of trading along with the average trading volume of 
the CAC40 constituent stocks. In terms of daily euro traded volume, the CAC40 Master Unit 
ranks 29
th within the CAC40 stocks. The number of trades recorded for the ETF is very small 
compared to genuine stocks, with an average of 219 transactions a day, but trades in the ETF 
are much larger. On average, more than 150,000 €, representing 4,152 units of trackers, that is 
41.52 times the euro-denominated value of the CAC40 index, are traded on each transaction 
whereas the median trade size for a CAC40 stock only amounts to 32,499 €. Hence, it clearly 
appears that the market for the CAC40 Master Unit is dominated by institutional traders rather 
than by individuals. Moreover, the CAC40 Master Unit trading level in its first six months of 
existence has been significant enough to affect market liquidity and arbitrage activity. 
Table 1 about here 
Potential effects are diverse but the most likely is undoubtedly the arbitrage hypothesis 
mentioned by Hegde and McDermott (2004). 
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2.1. The arbitrage hypothesis 
The findings of Hegde and McDermott (2004) suggest that the arbitrage activity between 
stock indices, futures and options might have increased with the introduction of ETFs. 
Assuming that markets are informationally segmented, the introduction of ETFs should 
improve the efficiency index stock and index futures prices through an increase of arbitrage 
trading, because it removes some of the obstacles that limit the arbitrageurs’ ability to 
establish their positions. The first testable implication on the introduction of CAC40 Master 
Unit that tracks the CAC40 index should therefore be a reduction in the frequency and value 
of deviations as the market should be more closely monitored and arbitrage portfolios should 
be less costly and risky to implement. However, assuming that tracking risk is the key 
problem in spot-futures pricing relationship, we should observe more mitigated effects than 
those observed in previous studies. Obviously, the CAC40 index is less difficult to track than 
indices that are constituted by a higher number of stocks, like the S&P 500 or the Nasdaq-100 
stock index that are the underlying indices of the futures contracts studied by Switzer, Varson 
and Zghidi (2000) and Kurov and Lasser (2002), respectively. 
The arbitrage hypothesis also entails a quicker reversion process when prices deviate 
from fundamental values. If ETFs effectively ease the construction of arbitrage portfolios, 
their introduction should result in shorter arbitrage delays, and prices should revert more 
rapidly to levels that prevent from subsequent arbitrage trades. 
Finally, this reduction in deviations may not be symmetric. Actually, sell arbitrages 
require to sell the underlying index, or more precisely short-sell the index if not previously 
owned by the arbitrageur. If there are benefits in trading the index through the ETFs rather 
than through the stock basket, these benefits should be even higher for short-selling. As a 
result, we should observe a reduction in the value of the deviations to the lower boundary, e.g. 
the boundary that triggers sell arbitrage trades. 
2.2. The liquidity hypothesis 
ETFs trade on a continuous market with dedicated market-makers posting firm quotes to 
the central order book. The introduction of market making on a security replicating the index 
may add depth to the index stock market and smooth temporary price tensions due to liquidity 
or noise trading in index components, in particular if noise traders prefer to trade in the ETF 
market for its lower cost. According to this hypothesis, the launch of the ETF would reduce   7
the probability of no-arbitrage violations but not necessarily shorten the time to efficiency 
unless the arbitrage hypothesis also holds. 
2.3. The adverse selection hypothesis 
An alternative hypothesis, modelled by Subramanyam (1991) designated as the adverse 
selection hypothesis by Hegde and McDermott (2004), relates to the ETF’s impact on 
informed trading. Subramanyam (1991) models the strategic behaviour of traders who can 
choose to trade either in the basket stock market or in the underlying stock markets. He 
demonstrates that the basket security market most probably serves as the lowest-cost market 
for the index. Under this hypothesis, adverse selection costs of component stocks will 
increase with the tracker’s introduction because liquidity traders switch to the ETF market 
while informed traders remain in the markets for the underlying securities. This decrease in 
the liquidity of the spot index stock market would then be detrimental to the no-arbitrage 
spot-futures relationship. With respect to the findings of Hegde and McDermott (2004) and 
the descriptive statistics on CAC40 stocks’ spreads and volumes reported in Table 3, we do 
not expect this theoretical hypothesis to be validated. 
3. Data and mispricing calculations 
The results presented in this paper are based on an empirical analysis of the spot-futures 
pricing relationship for the CAC40 index futures contract for a 12-month period spreading 
from August 2000 to July 2001. This period surrounds January 22, 2001, the introduction date 
of the ETF tracking the CAC40 index on NextTrack, which divides our sample into two sub-
periods of 121 and 133 trading days, respectively. CAC40 index and futures intraday data are 
extracted from Euronext Paris Market Database. One week to one year Euribor rates have 
been retrieved from Thomson Financial Datastream. 
3.1. CAC40 futures data 
The trading of the futures contract on the CAC40 index (ticker FCE) takes place on the 
Marché des Options Négociables de Paris (MONEP) from 8 am to 5.30 pm on the electronic 
trading system NSC-VF (day session) and from 5.30 pm to 10 pm on Globex (night session). 
Since its introduction in 1988, the FCE contract has experienced a tremendous growth in 
trading volume. In year 2000, it reached a daily average of 71 568 contracts traded. The size 
of the contract is equal to the value of the CAC40 index multiplied by 10 euros and the tick 
size is 0.5 index points. Eight maturities (three monthly, three quarterly and two half yearly)   8
are continuously open with a quotation horizon of 19 to 24 months. Settlement is in cash with 
a liquidation price equal to the arithmetic average (rounded to 1 decimal) of each CAC40 
index value calculated and reported on the settlement day between 3:40 pm and 4:00 pm, the 
first index value after 4:00 pm being included. Summary statistics of the daily activity of the 
FCE contract both on the pre- and post-introduction period are reported in  
Table 2. Trading clearly concentrates on the nearby maturity with an average of more 
than 10,000 transactions a day for contracts with a maturity of one to two months against less 
than 1,000 transactions for other maturities. Activity increased after the introduction of the 
ETF for all maturities except for the two most distant, which is consistent with the growth 
tendency of the French derivatives market. 
Table 2 about here 
The Euronext Paris intraday data comprises information for all transactions recorded on 
the FCE contract. It reports the expiration month, the futures price and the number of 
contracts traded for each transaction, time-stamped to the nearest second. As it is impossible 
to match the night-session transactions with contemporaneous index values, they are omitted 
from the analysis. 
3.2. CAC40 index data 
The CAC40 index consists of the 40 most actively traded stocks listed on the Main 
Market of the Paris Stock Exchange, the so-called “Premier Marché”. CAC40 components are 
selected not only according to liquidity criteria but also in order to be representative of 
various economic sectors. The CAC40 market value is calculated continuously as the market 
value weighted average of its 40 constituent stock prices, and disseminated every 30 seconds 
by Euronext Paris from 9 am to 5.30 pm. The CAC40 index values at 30-s intervals are 
extracted from the Euronext Paris Market Database. 
3.3. Mispricing calculations 
To compute the mispricing series, futures prices are associated with the spot index value. 
Since index futures markets generally lead cash index markets
6, we match futures prices with 
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precedes the cash leg when both legs are not established simultaneously.   9
the index value displayed at the time of the futures transaction or immediately following it. 
This procedure ensures that no more than 30 seconds elapsed between the two values. This 
selection process leads to a final sample of 2,927,326 futures prices associated with the 
prevailing spot index value. 
Theoretically, dividends delivered by the index constituent stocks must be accounted for 
in the derivation of the fair price. Kurov and Lasser (2002) argue that the dividend yield is so 
low on the Nasdaq-100 index that it can be neglected in the calculations of the theoretical 
price. Dividends on the French market are usually delivered on an annual basis and highly 
concentrated around May and June. Hence, ignoring dividends would lead to a potentially 
severe bias between the pre-introduction sample during which very few dividends have been 
delivered and the post-introduction sample that encompass dividend-paying months. Discrete 
dividends have been extracted from Thomson Financial Datastream and expressed in term of 
CAC40 index points on a daily basis. For each spot-futures pair, the present value of the 
dividends delivered between the trade and the expiration date of the contract is calculated 
using Euribor as a proxy for the risk-free interest rate. The interest rate we use as a proxy for 
the opportunity cost in the calculations is a linear interpolation of the Euribor rates prevailing 
on the transaction day for maturities surrounding the time to maturity of the FCE contract. 
We conduct ex post as well as ex ante tests of the cash-futures relationship. An 
observation is considered as an ex post deviation from efficient prices when equation (3) leads 
to a positive value either through the implementation of a sell or a buy arbitrage program. 
Ex ante tests consist in reproducing as closely as possible market conditions in order to 
assess the actual profit accessible to an arbitrageur whose trades are triggered by the 
observation of an ex post deviation. We compute ex ante profits considering that arbitrage 
strategies are executed at prices prevailing a few seconds after the observation of a price 
deviation. We consider several lags from 1 to 3 minutes and draw two main statistics for the 
whole set of ex post signals over our observation periods: the percentage of lagged strategies 
leading to positive profits and the average gain/loss resulting from these strategies. Ex ante 
profits will be positive in the case profits persist long enough or negative if prices revert to 
no-arbitrage values. 
The construction of spot-futures arbitrage strategies requires trading in the underlying 
stock basket. For the arbitrageurs, it results in different transaction costs, such as commissions 
and taxes as well as bid-ask spreads, price impacts and, in the case of sell arbitrages, short-  10
selling costs. The transaction costs associated with such trades depends both on market 
conditions and on orders’ aggressiveness. Estimation of such costs for every spot-futures pair 
identified in your database is not conceivable. However, discussions with professional 
arbitrageurs have led us to assume the following levels of transaction costs. For the futures 
contracts, bid-ask spreads are said to be very constant over time at a level of 5 basis points 
when including explicit costs, so that we charge each FCE contract trade .025%. Concerning 
the cash market, it is reasonable to assume that, on average,  a one-way CAC40 basket trade 
costs a half bid-ask spread of .125% plus 2 basis points for explicit fees, that is a total cost of 
.145%. As CAC40 stocks’ bid-ask spreads are more volatile that futures spreads, we also 
apply two other levels of transaction costs for trades on the CAC40 index stock basket: .10% 
and .15%, i.e. respectively .12% and 17% when adding explicit costs. Expected transaction 
costs to be supported at the liquidation of the arbitrage portfolios are estimated on the basis on 
the initial index value. For arbitrage opportunities that require selling the CAC40 index, we 
consider one additional scheme of transaction costs that includes short-selling costs of .10% 
supported pro rata temporis on the value of the index. 
4. Pre- / post-ETF-inception mispricing comparisons 
This section presents the empirical results based on pre- / post-introduction of the CAC40 
Master Unit comparisons of the spot-futures mispricing series. We first discuss the variation 
in frequency and value of ex post deviations for different levels of transaction costs. Then, we 
proceed to pre- and post-ETF ex ante profits, namely profits drawn from arbitrage trades 
established on the basis of deviation signals and executed with a time lag. 
4.1. Ex post deviations 
The results of the ex post mispricing tests for all the transactions recorded for the FCE 
futures contracts from August 2000 to the end of July 2001 are reported in Table 3 for our 
three different levels of transaction costs. Whatever the transaction costs we assume for the 
cash leg, there is a highly significant decline in the deviation frequency consecutive to the 
introduction of ETFs. As an example, for the .125% implicit-cost level, 1.86% of the pairings 
are outside the no-arbitrage boundaries during the first sample period, a frequency that drops 
to only .31% once trading in ETFs becomes possible. This finding is consistent with previous 
evidence by Kurov and Lasser (2002) of a decrease in the deviation frequency of the Nasdaq-
100 futures following the introduction of Cubes. The overall deviation frequency is however   11
clearly smaller on the French market since transaction costs of .50% are necessary for Kurov 
and Lasser to get comparable levels. 
Table 3 about here 
There is a slight asymmetry in the direction of deviations. Both before and after ETFs 
inception, sell arbitrages, that are also classically referred to as short arbitrage due to the short 
position taken in the index portfolio, are predominant, even once short-selling costs are 
accounting for. Although there is no consensus in previous empirical literature on the 
direction of deviations,
 7 the underpricing of index futures is classically related to restrictions 
or difficulties in short-selling. Since the improvement is more important for this category of 
deviations, our results suggest that ETFs actually facilitate the index short-selling. 
Results concerning the average absolute level of deviations are more intriguing. Whereas 
the mispricing frequency strongly decreases following the introduction of ETFs, their average 
(or median) value, on the contrary, significantly increases. 
Our results on ex post profits differ from previous studies mainly in two ways: firstly, 
deviation frequencies are very low, suggesting that the French market is heavily monitored; 
secondly, whereas frequencies decrease with the introduction of ETFs, deviation values, on 
the contrary, increase. One may wonder whether this is explained by the fact that, converse to 
previous studies, we work with all transactions and maturities, including futures contracts that 
mature up to one year later. Results are split between two panels in Table 4: panel A reports, 
with no distinction between buy and sell arbitrages, the results for the nearby maturity while 
panel B reports the results for all others maturities. 
Table 4 about here 
The nearby maturity accounts for the majority of trades in FCE contracts. As previously 
documented by MacKinlay and Ramaswamy (1988), Bhatt and Cakici (1990), Klemkosky 
and Lee (1991) and Switzer, Varson and Zghidi (2000) on the S&P 500 index futures, 
maturity appears to be a determinant of the deviation frequency, yet, as surprising as it may 
seem, it is not the case for deviation values. Results for the nearby maturity are similar to 
those for the whole sample. More interesting are the results for other maturities. Before the 
introduction of the CAC40 Master Unit, the deviation frequency for upper maturities is very 
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high, even when transaction costs are accounted for, but this percentage drops twenty fold 
after the ETF introduction, to reach comparable values to the nearby maturity. 
The pre-/ post-introduction profit comparisons do not suffice by themselves to conclude 
with certainty on the effect of the ETFs’ introduction on futures pricing efficiency. A variety 
of factors have been found to explain arbitrage opportunities on futures markets among which 
dividends, maturity, and liquidity play a crucial role. Differences in the values of these factors 
and particularly in the ease to establish the index legs on the cash market between the two 
sample periods may explain the results. Table 5 reports descriptive statistics on the trading of 
CAC40 index stocks before and after the introduction of the CAC40 Master Unit ETF. The 
post-introduction period is associated with more trading volume, more turnover, and smaller 
spreads and volatility. All market conditions suggest that trading the CAC40 stock basket is 
easier in the second period and, whether this evolution is due to the introduction of ETFs 
replicating the CAC40 index or to other institutional factors, it should affect the futures 
market efficiency. 
Table 5 about here 
Therefore, we control for these different factors with the following multivariate model: 
t t 7 T , t 6 T , t 5
T , t 4 t 3 t 2 t 1 0 T , t
ETF d Fmat
Fvol CACturn CACspr CACvol x
ε α α α
α α α α α
+ + + +
+ + + + =
  (4),
where  T , t x  is the daily average of the absolute deviation, computed according to 
equation (2), for each class of maturity (T = 1,…,6 corresponding to futures contract with 
distances to maturity from 1 month to 1 year, respectively) on day t;  t CACvol  is the CAC40 
intra-day volatility computed, for each day t, as the Parkinson (1980) volatility of the index 
value;  t CACspr  is the CAC40 average quoted spread computed as the capitalisation-weighted 
mean of CAC40 stocks’ duration-weighted average best-limit spreads on day t;  t CACturn  is 
the daily CAC40 turnover variable and equals for each day the euro traded volume in CAC40 
stocks in percentage of their total capitalisation;  , tT Fvol  is the logarithm of the daily total 
number of trades for futures contracts of a given maturity class T;  , tT Fmat  is the logarithm of 
the contract maturity in number of days at date t by maturity class T;  T , t d  is the dividend 
yield measured as the sum of the discounted dividends paid by the CAC40 index underlying 
stocks from date t to maturity in percentage of the value of the index; and  t ETF  is a dummy   13
variable that equals 0 before January 22nd, 2001 and 1 from January 22
nd, 2001 to July 31st, 
2001. This last variable captures any eventual structural shift that could be due to the 
introduction of the CAC40 Master Unit, once controlled for differences in other explaining 
factors. Regression results are displayed in Table 6. 
Table 6 about here 
Concerning the effect of volatility, opposite arguments can be put forward. On the one 
hand, the general view is that volatility increases the probability of occurrence and the 
magnitude of price deviations (Yadav and Pope (1994), Kurov and Lasser (2002)). On the 
other hand, higher volatility may lead to a tighter spot-futures relationship by inviting more 
arbitrage services. Active trading correlated to volatility would accelerate price reversion and 
make profits vanish more rapidly. Whereas previous empirical literature has confirmed the 
first hypothesis, we find a significantly negative coefficient for volatility and validate the 
second explanation with our sample. 
The payment of dividends by underlying stocks has a much clearer effect and has always 
been found to enhance mispricing, what we confirm with our data. Given that most French 
companies pay their dividends in May or June, all dividend deliveries cluster in our second 
period. This explain in part the larger values of deviations in spite of their lower frequency in 
the post-ETF period. Estimates for other index-related control variables are consistent with 
the intuition: ex post absolute deviations significantly increase with underlying stocks’ 
spreads and decrease with their turnover. 
The most significant variables are those related to the futures market, i.e. the daily 
number of futures trades and the contract maturity. The high correlation between these two 
factors creates collinearity. As maturity is found to have the best explanatory power (see 
Model 1 and Model 2 in Table 6), we drop  , tT Fvol  from the analysis and control for maturity 
solely. When the ETF dummy is added to that model (Model 3), its coefficient is significantly 
negative at the 1% threshold. This negative sign indicates a reduction in the average level of 
mispricing in the post-ETF-inception period which cannot be attributed to changes in 
volatility, liquidity or other market factors. 
4.2. Ex ante deviations 
We now turn to the ex ante tests of the spot-futures relationship. Every ex post deviation 
identified at the .145% transaction cost level is used as a signal that triggers, after a time lag 
of 30 seconds to three minutes, arbitrage trades, and subsequent gains or losses, designated as   14
ex ante profits, are computed. Comparison tests are conducted for the whole population of 
arbitrage signals and for different categories of arbitrages: long arbitrages, short arbitrages 
without short sale and short arbitrages with short-selling costs. Results are presented in Table 
7. 
Table 7 about here 
Overall, as it appears in Panel A, the introduction of the ETFs do not seem to enhance the 
futures market efficiency. Actually, even though pricing efficiency increases with the duration 
of the lag that is imposed before arbitrage execution, the persistence of profits is still high 
both in frequency and in value, and the introduction of the CAC40 Master Unit does not 
improve this pattern. For example, with a two-minute lag, 64.38% of ex post signals lead to a 
positive ex ante profit in post-introduction period, while this persistence frequency equalled 
57.57% only in the previous period. Moreover, the average ex ante profit after the CAC40 
Master Unit introduction, is three times the average profit observed before introduction. 
However, this overall result hides a high variety of findings. First of all, the number of 
signals, or ex post deviations, drops from 13,705 before ETFs inception to only 2,176 after. 
Hence, there is more persistence in the post-inception period but among a smaller sample of 
signals. Second, buy and sell arbitrage programs differ systematically. 
While no efficiency improvement is observed for long arbitrages, the frequency of 
positive profits and the mean value of ex ante arbitrage pay-offs decrease significantly for sell 
programs (cf. Panel C of Table 7). For example, for a 2-mn lag, the percentage of short 
arbitrages that yield gains drops from 64.32% in the pre-ETF period to 48.52% in the post-
ETF period and average sell arbitrage profits become negative, falling from .02% to -.01%. 
The result holds for all lags, whether short-sale costs are accounted for or not. 
Since initial profits are significantly different in the 2 sub-periods, the interpretation of ex 
ante profit levels invites further investigation. To provide a more accurate picture of the 
CAC40 Master Unit impact, ex ante profit values should be examined relatively to ex post 
profit values, the relevant question being whether the proportion of an ex post observable 
profit that cannot be realised due to delay in execution is larger after the ETF inception. 
Therefore, we conduct comparison tests on differential profits calculated as the ex ante profit 
minus the initial ex post profit. Results are presented in Table 8 in the same manner as for 
Table 7. 
Table 8 about here   15
Overall, for all lags superior to one minute and contrary to the previous ex ante results, 
the loss between the average or median expected profit and the realized profit is higher once 
trading in ETFs has become possible. For example, at the three-minute lag for the whole 
sample, the difference between the average ex post profit and the average realised profit is of 
–.08% for the second period against –.05% for the first. Similarly to previous findings, panels 
B and C shows that this result is essentially assignable to sell arbitrage trades. 
The impact of the introduction of the CAC40 Master Unit identified through the ex ante 
tests clearly differs according to the direction of the initial mispricing. The CAC40 Master 
Unit introduction has clearly tightened the no-arbitrage pricing relationship on its sell-
arbitrage side but had no beneficial effect on its buy side. One possible explanation for this 
asymmetric result is an enhanced easiness to short sell in the spot market with ETF stocks, 
which favoured sell-arbitrage programs. 
5. Time to efficiency 
The present section is dedicated to the analysis of time to efficiency, that is the the time is 
takes for prices deviating from efficiency to revert to fair values. 
5.1. Measuring time to efficiency 
The measure of mispricing duration we use in this study, namely time to efficiency 
(TTE), has initially been proposed by Deville (2004) in efficiency tests of the French CAC40 
index options markets. It is defined as the time it takes for prices to revert to values that are 
compatible with no arbitrage, once a deviation has been identified. The way this measure is 
computed is the following. For a given level of transaction costs, we identify all the spot-
futures pairings that deviates from arbitrage boundaries. For these observations, we re-
compute the value of equation (3), the values of the futures contract and of the index being 
updated every time we observe a new futures trade or a new index value. We proceed to this 
updating process as long as the computed “profit” remains positive. The time to efficiency is 
the time that goes by between the identification of the ex post deviation and the time when the 
profit first becomes zero or negative. 
Hence, contrary to studies on the mean reversion of futures prices, we do not focus our 
attention on the futures price variations but also account for variations in the index value. 
Moreover, we do not look for a reversion in the direction of the deviation (sell arbitrages that   16
become profitable buy arbitrages and vice versa) but for a variation in the futures price and 
the index value that is enough to make the arbitrage profit zero. 
Time to efficiency has been computed for all spot-futures pairings deviating from no-
arbitrage for the three transaction costs levels. The obtained durations as well as pre-/post-
inception tests are reported in Table 9. Overall, whatever the direction of the arbitrage and the 
transaction costs level, index and futures prices revert to values contained between the no-
arbitrage boundaries within an average of 45 minutes. For the nearby maturity, TTEs amount 
from an average as low as 30 seconds for the pre-inception period and the .15% transaction 
costs level to a maximum average of 14 minutes and 20 seconds for the post inception period 
and the .125% transaction costs level. Even if TTEs seem to decrease with the transaction 
costs level for the nearby maturity, no clear pattern appears for the other maturities. 
Table 9 about here 
For almost all samples but sell arbitrages at the .10% transaction costs level, TTE 
increases with the introduction of the CAC40 Master Unit which suggests deterioration in 
efficiency with significance at the 1% level. Nevertheless, this pattern must be related to be 
the level of the initial deviation that the market has to absorb as the level of ex post deviation 
is significantly higher in the post-inception period. For that reason, we seek whether the ETF 
effectively deteriorated the inefficiency durations after controlling for deviation value as well 
as other determinants, in the following regression model: 
( ) t t 4 T , t 3 T , t 2 T , t 1 0 T , t ETF d Fvol TTE η β β β π β β π + + + + + =   (5).
where  T , t π  is the average absolute deviation, measured with a total transaction cost level of 
.145%, on day t for maturity T;  ( ) T , t TTE π  is the average TTE for the same date and maturity 
class;  T , t Fvol ,  T , t d  and  t ETF  are defined as in the previous section. Table 10 lays out the 
estimates. 
Table 10 about here 
Regressions of short-arbitrage TTE and long-arbitrage TTE are run separately because they 
exhibit different pattern. The intercept for sell-arbitrage TTE is much higher that the one for 
buy-arbitrage TTE, which confirms that TTE are longer in the case of short-arbitrage profit 
opportunities. As expected, the variable that most contributes to mispricing reduction is 
trading activity: TTE strongly decrease with the number of trades in the futures market for all 
types of deviations. The longer TTE for buy arbitrages in the second period are also explained   17
by the higher level of profits and the delivery of dividends. Conversely to what suggested the 
comparison of pre- and post-ETF-inception TTE mean values, the introduction of the tracker 
has negatively impacted TTEs, but this positive effect on the price reversion process is 
significant for short-arbitrage deviations only. This result is consistent with what we found for 
ex ante profits. 
6. Conclusion 
Comparing two six-month periods, we find that the introduction of the CAC40 Master 
Unit securities on the French market on January 22
nd 2001 has benefited efficiency and 
tightened the spot-futures price relationship with regard to the significant reduction in 
deviation frequency observed during the six months following the fund creation. When 
controlling for different market factors such as volatility, liquidity and dividends, average 
absolute deviations are found to have decreased in the post-inception period independently 
from these market factors. We thus validate the arbitrage and liquidity hypotheses whereas we 
reject the adverse selection hypothesis. 
Concerning realised profits and price-reversion speed, our results are more mitigated, 
probably because at the time the CAC40 tracker was launched, the CAC40 index futures 
market was already well monitored compared to other futures markets. The fair pricing of the 
CAC40 futures contract was nevertheless asymmetric, sell arbitrage opportunities being more 
frequent than buy ones. Potential efficiency benefits, if any, were to be expected on the sell 
side. It is thus not surprising that our analysis of price-reversion speed, based upon a 
comparison of lagged-arbitrage profits and times to efficiency, leads us to the conclusion that 
the introduction of the CAC40 Master Unit has fastened the arbitrage process on the sell side 
of the cash-futures relationship solely.   18
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Table 1. Trading volume on CAC40 securities after CAC40 Master Unit 
introduction 
  CAC40 stocks' cross-sectional statistics  CAC40 
Master Unit 
 Mean  Median  Min  Max    Mean  Rank
Average daily traded volume (€)  91,226,184.8  59,769,501.7 12,953,632.9 406,761,649.3  33,712,242.3 29
Average daily number of trades  2,267.3  1,871.7 698.7 12,880.0    219.9 42
Average trade size (€)  36,177.8  32,499.2 12,367.7 103,532.1    153,314.1 1
This table compares trading volumes of the CAC40 Master Unit to those of CAC40 stocks from January 22
nd, 2001 to 
July 31
st, 2001, on the basis of daily traded volumes in €, daily number of trades and trade sizes in €. It provides cross-
sectional statistics (mean, median, minimum and maximum) of individual CAC40-stocks’ daily averages as well as the 
daily average for the CAC40 Master Unit and the rank of the CAC40 Master Unit when ordered against CAC40 
securities. 
   22
 




number of trades 
Average daily traded volume in 
number of contracts 
Before ETF inception (121 trading days) 
1 10,321.7  44,454.1 
2 529.2  10,465.1 
3 62.9  784.4 
4 35.6  1,866.7 
5 11.5  151.9 
6 2.3  17.5 
All 10,963.0  57,739.7 
After ETF inception (133 trading days) 
1 11,316.5  52,491.8 
2 600.1  16,869.5 
3 74.1  1,192.0 
4 43.3  1,698.4 
5 1.8  202.0 
6 0.2  128.6 
All 12,036.1  72,582.3 
This table reports the average number of trades and the average number of traded 
contracts per day for each contract maturity over our two observation periods.   23
Table 3. Ex post deviations from the CAC40 spot-futures no arbitrage pricing 
relationship before and after CAC40 Master Unit inception 


















Buy arbitrages           
Violation frequency           
Number of observations  1,326,524  1,600,802 1,326,524 1,600,802 1,326,524 1,600,802  1,326,524 1,600,802
Number of violations  627,048  676,136 12,233 2,266 4,456 1,732 1,826 1,497
Percentage of violations  47.27  42.24 0.92 0.14 0.34 0.11  0.14 0.09
Z-statistic   ---  -86.27  --- -88.55  --- -40.26   --- -10.97
Deviation values (in %)           
Average 0.07  0.04 0.09 0.19 0.15 0.19  0.28 0.16
Student statistic   ---  -282.50  --- 28.49  --- 7.54   --- -14.57
Mann-Whitney statistic   ---  -272.06  --- 40.79  --- 28.88   --- -2.66
Sell arbitrages without short sale         
Violation frequency           
Number of observations  1,326,524  1,600,802 1,326,524 1,600,802 1,326,524 1,600,802  1,326,524 1,600,802
Number of violations  698,813  923,559 35,984 4,125 20,153 2,305 9,331 1,463
Percentage of violations  52.68  57.69 2.71 0.26 1.52 0.14  0.70 0.09
Z-statistic   ---  85.93  --- -167.43  --- -124.63   --- -80.12
Deviation values (in %)           
Average 0.09  0.05 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.08  0.04 0.07
Student statistic   ---  -335.37  --- 12.37  --- 19.15   --- 15.32
Mann-Whitney statistic   ---  -279.28  --- 6.20  --- 19.18   --- 15.73
Sell arbitrages with short-selling costs        
Violation frequency           
Number of observations      1,326,524 1,600,802 1,326,524 1,600,802  1,326,524 1,600,802
Number of violations    33,106 3,651 17,985 2,110  7,843 1,288
Percentage of violations      2.50 0.23 1.36 0.13  0.59 0.08
Z-statistic       --- 161.29  --- 117.21   --- 72.73
Deviation values (in %)           
Average    0.07 0.09 0.05 0.08  0.04 0.07
Student statistic       --- 15.46  --- 20.48   --- 17.41
Mann-Whitney statistic         --- 10.57  --- 20.95   --- 19.80
For each sample period, that is six months prior to ETF inception (August 1
st, 2000 to January 21
st, 2001) and six 
months after (January 22
nd, 2001 to July 31
st, 2001), the table reports the number of observations (spot index-futures 
pairings), the number and percentage of violations of the no arbitrage relationship, the average mispricing in 
percentage of the index value, for different levels of implicit transaction costs k for the cash leg to which an explicit 
cost of .02% is added. A total trading cost of .025% is applied to the futures leg. Z-statistics test the difference in 
violation frequency before and after CAC40 Master Unit inception. Student statistics test the difference in average 
mispricing between both observation periods. Mann-Whitney statistics test the difference in median mispricing.   24
Table 4. Ex post deviations from the CAC40 spot-futures no arbitrage pricing 
relationship by maturity classes 
Transaction costs level  k=0,10%  k=0,125%  k=0,15% 












Panel A: Nearby maturity        
Violation frequency        
Number of observations  1,248,923  1,505,100 1,248,923 1,505,100 1,248,923  1,505,100
Number  of  violations  32,958 5,073 13,498 3,428 4,488 2,531
Percentage of violations  2.64  0.34 1.08 0.23 0.36  0.17
Z-statistic   ---  -152.43  --- -85.00  ---  -30.30
Deviation values (in %)    
Average  0.06 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.12 0.12
Student statistic   ---  36.66  --- 24.68  ---  1.13
Median  0.04 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.09
Mann-Whitney statistic   ---  46.63  --- 46.79  ---  26.47
Panel B: Other maturities        
Violation frequency        
Number of observations  77,601  95,702 77,601 95,702 77,601  95,702
Number  of  violations  12,381 844 8,943 414 5,180 254
Percentage of violations  15.95  0.88 11.52 0.43 6.68  0.27
Z-statistic   ---  -111.75  --- -95.15  ---  -70.34
Deviation values (in %)    
Average  0.09 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.12
Student statistic   ---  -0.52  --- 8.44  ---  11.34
Median  0.09 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.11
Mann-Whitney statistic   ---  -9.00  --- 6.68  ---  14.16  25
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics on CAC40-stocks’ trading activity 
 
Before ETF-inception 
Aug. 1st,2000-Jan. 21st,2001 
After ETF-inception 
Jan. 22nd,2001-Jul. 31st,2001 
Average daily total trading volume  3,562,453,709 €  3,694,842,986 € 
Average daily total number of trades  91,595  91,197 
Average turnover  0.2969%  0.3374% 
Average best-limits bid-ask spread  0.1744%  0.1521% 
Average CAC40-index volatility  1.0702%  1.0500% 
For each observation period, this table displays the daily average of the total euro trading volume in CAC40 
stocks, the corresponding average daily number of trades, the average daily turnover computed each day as 
the percentage of the total CAC capitalisation traded on the market, the average best-quotes bid-ask spread 
computed as the daily mean of the capitalisation-weighted average of duration-weighted individual stocks’ 
bid-ask spreads and the daily mean of the CAC40-index volatility calculated with intraday values according 
to Parkinson (1980).   26
Table 6. Explaining ex post deviations from the cash-futures efficient pricing relationship 
  Model 1    Model 2    Model 3 
Explaining variables  Coefficient t value P-value Coefficient  t value P-value Coefficient t value P-value
Intercept  0.10075*** 3.17 0.0016 -0.11785***  -3.63 0.0003 0.03579  0.91 0.3618
t CACvol   -0.03155*** -3.66 0.0003 -0.03258*** -3.90 0.0001 -0.02406*** -2.90 0.0038
t CACspr   0.81296*** 4.52 <0.0001 0.62314*** 3.56 0.0004 -0.13656  -0.66 0.5071
t CACturn   -0.08261** -2.17 0.0305 -0.07119*  -1.92 0.0549 -0.05488  -1.51 0.1317
T , t Fvol   -0.01269*** -11.68 <0.0001 --- --- --- --- --- ---
T , t Fmat   ---  --- --- 0.04769*** 14.52 <0.0001 0.04189*** 12.57 <0.0001
T , t d   0.04272*** 6.57 <0.0001 0.02452*** 3.68 0.0002 0.03976*** 5.74 <0.0001
t ETF   --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.05176*** -6.70 <0.0001
Number of observations  1074 1074 1074 
Adjusted R²  22.00% 26.54% 29.50% 
This table reports the estimates of OLS regressions of average absolute deviations from the efficient cash-futures price relationship, by day and by 
contract maturity. Deviations are calculated according to equation (2).  t CACvol  is the CAC40 intra-day volatility for each day t, computed as the 
Parkinson (1980) volatility of the index value.  t CACspr  is the capitalisation-weighted mean of CAC40 stocks’ duration-weighted average best-limit 
spreads on day t.  t CACturn  equals for each day the euro traded volume in CAC40 stocks in percentage of their total capitalisation.  T , t Fvol  is the 
logarithm of the daily total number of trades for the T-maturity futures contract.  T , t Fmat  is the logarithm of the contract maturity in number of days 
at date t. The dividend yield  T , t d  is measured as the discounted dividends paid by the underlying stocks from date t to futures maturity in percentage 
of the value of the index.  t ETF  equals 0 before January 22
nd, 2001 and 1 from January 22
nd, 2001 to July 31
st, 2001. Collinearity does not allow to 
introduce the futures number of trades and the futures maturity in the same regression. Comparison of Model 1 and 2 shows that maturity has the 
highest explanatory power.   27
Table 7. Results of the ex ante simulated arbitrage strategies 
Panel A – All arbitrages           
Delay before arbitrage  60s  120s  180s  












Profit frequency            
Number of ex post signals  13,705 2,176 13,705 2,176 13,705  2,176
Number of positive ex ante profits  8,589 1,515 7,890 1,401 7,464  1,327
Percentage of positive ex ante profits  62.67 69.62 57.57 64.38 54.46  60.98
Z-statistic   --- 6.50  --- 6.14   ---  5.78
Ex ante profit  values (in %)    
Average ex ante profit  0.03 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.01  0.05
Student statistic   --- 9.34  --- 7.41    6.88
Median  0.02 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.01  0.06
Mann-Whitney statistic   --- 20.84  --- 18.44   ---  17.18
Panel B – Buy arbitrages           
Delay before arbitrage  60s  120s  180s  












Profit frequency            
Number of ex post signals  2,548 969 2,548 969 2,548  969
Number of positive ex ante profits  1,191 814 882 790 787  758
Percentage of positive ex ante profits  46.74 84.00 34.62 81.53 30.89  78.22
Z-statistic   --- 24.24  --- 30.02   ---  29.38
Ex ante profit  values (in %)    
Average ex ante profit  0.07 0.15 0.04 0.14 0.02  0.13
Student statistic   --- 7.62  --- 8.76   ---  9.86
Median  -0.003 0.15 -0.03 0.14 -0.03 0.14
Mann-Whitney statistic   --- 22.43  --- 24.40   ---  24.79
Panel C – Sell arbitrages           
Delay before arbitrage  60s  120s  180s  












Profit frequency            
Number of ex post signals  11,157 1,207 11,157 1,207 11,157  1,207
Number of positive ex ante profits  7,398 701 7,008 611 6,677  569
Percentage of positive ex ante profits  66.31 58.08 62.81 50.62 59.85  47.14
Z-statistic   --- -5.53  --- -8.07   ---  -8.41
Ex ante profit  values (in %)    
Average ex ante profit  0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01  -0.02
Student statistic   --- -1.74  --- -4.08   ---  -4.91
Median  0.026 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02  0.00
Mann-Whitney statistic   --- -0.26  --- -3.29   ---  -4.45
For each sample period, the table reports statistics on the frequency and values of arbitrage profits for arbitrage 
strategies triggered by the observation of cash-futures mispricing (ex post signal) and executed with a delay, six 
different delays being considered from 30 seconds to three minutes. All arbitrage gains/losses are calculated 
with a .145% total transaction cost on the cash leg. Panel A provides global statistics for all categories of 
arbitrage strategies, either buy or sell arbitrages, with a short selling rate of .10% on the index leg for sell 
arbitrages. Panel B and C concern buy arbitrages and sell arbitrages with short-selling costs, respectively. Each 
panel displays, for a given lag, the number of futures trade times when a cash-futures mispricing is detected, the 
number and the percentage of profitable lagged arbitrages, the average and the median values of arbitrage gains   28
(possible losses being taken into account) in percentage of the index value. Z-statistics test the difference in 
frequency of profitable lagged arbitrages before and after CAC40 Master Unit inception. Student (Mann-
Whitney) statistics test the difference in the average (median) profit between both observation periods.   29
Table 8. Ex ante tests results based on the differences 
between ex ante and ex post profits 
Panel A – All arbitrages        














Number of ex post profits  13,705 2,176 13,705 2,176 13,705  2,176
Average difference  -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05  -0.08
Student statistic   --- -5.38  --- -6.23  ---  -5.94
Median difference  -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04  -0.05
Mann-Whitney statistic   --- -2.93  --- -5.76  ---  -6.54
Panel B – Buy arbitrages        














Number of ex post profits  2,548 969 2,548 969 2,548  969
Average difference  -0.06 -0.04 -0.09 -0.05 -0.11  -0.05
Student statistic   --- 4.21  --- 6.56  ---  7.47
Median difference  -0.04 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 -0.07  -0.03
Mann-Whitney statistic   --- 9.55  --- 11.64  ---  11.35
Panel C – Sell arbitrages        














Number of ex post profits  11,157 1,207 11,157 1,207 11,157  1,207
Average difference  -0.03 -0.07 -0.03 -0.09 -0.04  -0.10
Student statistic   --- -7.90  --- -9.47  ---  -9.84
Median difference  -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03  -0.06
Mann-Whitney statistic   --- -10.02  --- -13.58  ---  -14.07
For each sample period, the table reports statistics on the difference between profits resulting from an 
arbitrage triggered by the observation of a cash-futures mispricing and the ex post profit that served as 
a signal. Six different delays between the signal and the execution of the arbitrage from 30 seconds to 
three minutes are considered. All arbitrage gains/losses are calculated with a .145% total transaction 
cost on the cash leg. Panel A provides global statistics for all categories of arbitrage strategies, either 
long-hedge or short-hedge with a short selling rate of .10% on the index leg for short-hedge arbitrages. 
Panel B and C concern buy arbitrage strategies and sell arbitrage strategies with short-selling costs, 
respectively. Each panel displays, for a given lag, the number of mispricing signals, the average and 
the median values of the ex ante profit minus the observed ex post profit in percentage of the index 
value. Student (Mann-Whitney) statistics test the difference in the average (median) differential profit 
before and after CAC40 Master Unit inception.   30
Table 9. Time to efficiency of the CAC40 index futures for pre- 
(01/08/00-22/01/01) and post-CAC40 Master Unit inception (22/01/01-
31/07/01) samples 
Transaction cost level  k=0,10% k=0,125% k=0,15% 
Observation period  Pre- Post- Pre- Post- Pre- Post- 
Panel A. Buy arbitrages        
Average TTE (in seconds)        
Nearby maturity  109 690 86 860 144  495 
Student statistic   --- 38.85  --- 46.35  ---  32.07 
Other maturities  627 937 878 1206 1094  1349 
Student statistic   --- 1.90  --- 1.47  ---  0.93 
Panel B. Sell arbitrages with short-selling costs      
Average TTE (in seconds)        
Nearby maturity  258 415 80 250 30  137 
Student  statistic    13.10  24.54  18.63 
Other maturities 2444 1001 1107 1543 488  2532 
Student statistic   --- -10.28  --- 1.66  ---  4.58 
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Table 10. Explaining time to efficiency 
Dependent variables    ( )
buy
T , t TTE π     ( ) sell
T , t TTE π  
Explaining variables    Coefficient  t-statistic P-value   Coefficient t-statistic P-value 
Intercept   7.95923***  11.94 <0.0001 9.22959***  27.65  <0.0001
T , t π    3.07289***  3.46 0.0008 0.23786  0.28  0.7822
T , t Fvol    -0.65014*** -8.56 <0.0001 -0.67901*** -13.22  <0.0001
T , t d    1.20229**  2.05 0.0436 0.05285  0.19  0.8495
t ETF    -0.46429  -1.34 0.1822 -1.17893*** -4.03  <0.0001
Number of observations    98 191   
Adjusted R²    61.16% 58.58%   
( ) buy
T , t TTE π  and  ( ) sell
T , t TTE π  are the daily averages of times to efficiency in logarithm, respectively for long and short 
arbitrage profits, measured on day t for contracts of maturity T.  T , t π  is the mean profit, either for long arbitrages or 
for short arbitrages, on day t for maturity T. All profits are computed assuming a total transaction cost of .025% for 
the futures leg and .145% for the index leg. For short arbitrages, a short selling rate of .10% is applied on the cash 
leg.  T , t Fvol  is the total number of trades in logarithm for the maturity class T on date t.  T , t d  is the total amount of 
discounted dividends paid by the index from date t to maturity in percentage of the index value.  t ETF  is a dummy 
variable equal to 0 (1) before (after) ETF inception. 
 